The US has long incentivized retirement saving in 401(k) and similar retirement accounts by permitting workers to defer taxes on contributions, levying them instead when retirees withdraw funds in retirement. This paper develops a dynamic life cycle model to show how and whether 'Rothification' -that is, taxing 401(k) contributions rather than payouts -would alter household saving, investment, and Social Security claiming patterns. We show that these changes differ importantly for low-versus higher-paid workers. We conclude that moving to a system that taxes pension contributions instead of withdrawals will lead to later retirement ages, particularly for the better-educated. It also would reduce work hours and lifetime tax payments and increase wealth and consumption inequality. In addition, we show how these behaviors would differ in a persistently low interest rate environment versus a more "normal" historical return world.
1
How Would 401(k) 'Rothification' Alter Saving, Retirement Security, and Inequality?
The US has long incentivized retirement saving by deferring taxes on workers' pension contributions until the assets are withdrawn in old age, at which point the withdrawn funds become subject to income tax. In this way, most 401(k) retirement accounts are taxed according to an "EET" regime: workers contribute out of pre-tax earnings, recognize pre-tax investment earnings in their accounts, and pay income tax on withdrawals during retirement. This policy has a large current budgetary cost: the US Treasury foregoes over $100 billion per year due to tax-deferred contributions to 401(k) and similar plans (Thornton 2017) . 1 Partly because of projected federal budget shortfalls, some policymakers have recently proposed eliminating or capping tax-qualified retirement plan contributions, a practice termed 'Rothification,' named after Senator William Roth who successfully passed legislation allowing this in 1997.
Specifically, the idea would be to treat all future retirement contributions to a "TEE" regime, in which workers would contribute to their pensions out of after-tax income, and then no additional tax would be levied thereafter (Schoeff 2017) .
The Rothification idea has been a topic of considerable recent discussion, with former President Obama recommending a pre-tax pension contribution cap in 2015, and related proposals were offered by the Trump Administration during the 2017 tax reform debate.
Though those proposals were not enacted, the topic is certain to be revisited given the amount of revenue involved. In an economy with a single tax rate and a flat benefit system, taxing benefits now versus later is unlikely to change behavior. Yet in the US economy, there are numerous nonlinearities in the tax and Social Security systems which render less obvious the ways in which such a reform might alter household behavior. Accordingly, if such a reform 1 The Federal Government does receive some of the deferred tax revenue later when benefits are paid out, but retirees are often in a lower tax bracket than when working. Moreover the deferral of taxes tends to mean that the revenue is not 'captured' in the traditional 10-year accounting window used for revenue neutrality calculations. Hence moving the tax capture forward is politically appealing to some; see Sibaie (2017). were to be passed in the future, it could have important implications for household behavior.
Moreover, effects are likely to vary across different population subgroups.
To date, however, there has been no coherent microeconomic analysis of how Rothification could alter household consumption, saving, retirement patterns, and taxpayments. Our paper fills this gap by developing a richly detailed and state-of-the-art life cycle stochastic dynamic model with endogenous work effort, portfolio choice, consumption, saving, and Social Security claiming patterns, to evaluate such a policy's potential effects for the population overall and for different population subgroups. Of key importance is heterogeneity: that is, how outcomes will differ for workers with different lifetime earnings profiles. For instance, some have argued that "Roths may not, in fact, work out to be a better deal" for low income people (Tergesen 2017) , while others argue the opposite. 2 We therefore assess how key outcomes change for a variety of worker-types differentiated by sex and education.
Additionally, it is important to recognize that converting retirement plans to Roth plans would take place against the backdrop of the new income tax structure implemented in 2018 which reduced the tax burden for most earners. 3 The tax reform therefore also changed the relative attractiveness of saving for retirement in an EET environment, since lower marginal tax rates on workers' earnings decreased the attractiveness of saving in 401(k) accounts. Our research therefore also compares how work, saving, benefit claiming behavior, and tax payments would respond in an EET versus TEE setting, for a heterogeneous set of workers.
Finally, we analyze how our results would differ if the economy were to move out of the very low interest rate environment of the last decade, and return to a more "normal" regime.
We know that persistent low returns spur workers to save and invest differently and can also drive different decisions about how long to work and when to claim Social Security benefits (Horneff, Maurer, and Mitchell 2018) . The quantitative easing policies of the US Federal Reserve Bank after the financial crisis have resulted in extraordinarily low real US Treasury yields over the past decade, compared to the normal historical real return of 3% (1989-2008) . 4 We seek to study how appealing Rothification might be in this new low interest rate environment, compared to the traditional EET framework for the $5 trillion invested in 40(k) assets.
In what follows, we first build and calibrate a structural life cycle model assuming an EET framework calibrated to US federal/state income tax and Social Security/Medicare premium structures and realistic Social Security benefit formulas including adjustments for early and delayed claiming. Importantly, the baseline model also incorporates real-world rules characterizing EET tax-qualified 401(k) accounts including the current caps on 401(k) pre-tax contributions, employer matches, penalties and taxes on early withdrawals, and Required Minimum Distribution withdrawals. We show that our results agree closely with observed consumption, saving, and Social Security claiming age behavior of U.S. households, while matching the current distribution of 401(k) wealth rather nicely.
Next, we develop results under an alternative environment where 401(k) contributions are taxed according to a TEE structure. This permits us to identify changes in behavior for the heterogeneous workers described above, under the two tax regimes (EET versus TEE). Next, we compare results with those obtained in a higher real return environment. In particular, we assess whether the lower-paid behave differently from the higher-paid in terms of savings inside and outside the tax-qualified accounts, as well as in non-pension savings accounts, and whether they would change their claiming behavior for Social Security benefits. In addition, we are interested in how Rothification would alter the distribution of retirement incomes relative to the current EET-system. For example, the gap between high and low-wage workers' take home pay is not diminished by income taxes under an EET system, whereas it is under a TEE program.
Moreover, the Social Security replacement rate formula is progressive, as it provides relatively higher benefits for low-wage workers than for the higher paid. Given this, an EET scheme enhances the progressivity of overall old age income (pension account withdrawals plus Social Security benefits), whereas a TEE structure treats retirement benefits more neutrally.
Accordingly, it is theoretically unclear how Rothification will alter household behavior without modeling the rich institutional details confronting real-world consumers, along with the economic environment, capital and labor market risk, and uncertain lifetimes. The paper also compares expected household tax payments over the life cycle under both the EET and TEE regimes. We conclude that taxing pension contributions instead of withdrawals leads to delayed retirement, lower lifetime tax payments, reductions in consumption, and higher consumption inequality. Retirement asset accumulation is also lower under the Rothification regime.
Related Literature
This research builds on prior work Mitchell 2018, 2019) by exploring the impact of a Rothification reform for 401(k) plans. Here we add to the literature by delving into the distributional impacts of such a reform in both a "normal" and a low return environment, while accounting for the income tax regime recently adopted. Our work is informed by a number of studies using a life cycle framework to model and evaluate how individuals respond to a range of environmental shocks. For example, the workhorse model of Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout (2005) and Gomes and Michaelides (2005) was subsequently extended by Love (2010) and Hubener, Maurer, and Mitchell (2016) , who showed how family shocks due to changes in marital status and children alter optimal consumption, insurance, asset allocation, and retirement patterns. Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Rogalla (2015) demonstrated how capital market surprises can influence saving and portfolio allocation patterns. Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira. (2008) and Chai, Horneff, Maurer, and Mitchell (2011) showed how flexible work patterns can help people hedge both earnings and capital market risk. Gomes, Michaelides, and Polkovnichenko (2009) demonstrated the impact of taxable and tax-deferred accounts on optimal saving over the lifecycle.
In the present paper, we evaluate how people might optimally respond to a TEE versus the current EET tax regime for retirement accounts by adjusting their consumption, saving, investment, and retirement patterns. In addition we analyze these possible changes in optimal behavior if the capital market were to move away from a persistently low return environment to what used to be perceived as the "normal" return environment. In contrast to our life cycle model in Horneff, Maurer, and Mitchell (forthcoming) , we do not include annuity purchases but we do allow flexible work effort and endogenous claiming of Social Security benefits. 5
The Consumer's Lifecycle Problem: Model and Calibration
In what follows, we build and calibrate a structural dynamic consumption and portfolio choice model for an individual maximizing his utility over his life cycle using a richly specified, sophisticated formulation of lifetime behavior calibrated to US federal/state income tax and Social Security/Medicare premium structures, along with realistic Social Security benefit formulas. 6 Just as importantly, the baseline model also incorporates real-world rules characterizing EET tax-qualified 401(k) accounts including the current U.S. caps on 401(k) pretax contributions, employer matches, penalties and taxes on early withdrawals, and Required Minimum Distribution withdrawal amounts. Results using calibrated baseline parameters agree closely with observed consumption, saving, and Social Security claiming age patterns of U.S. households. Specifically, our model generates a large peak at the earliest claiming age at 62 5 We also provide a theoretical backing for the empirical claiming age patterns identified by Slavov (2012, 2014) . 6 In particular, we take account of Social Security PIA and AIME formulas, as well as early and delayed retirement adjustments, and full retirement ages. along with a second peak at the (system-defined) Full Retirement Age, and the model also matches the current distribution of 401(k) wealth rather nicely (Horneff et al. 2018) .
Preferences. We work in discrete time and assume that the worker's decision period starts at = 1 (age 25) and ends at = 76 (age 100); accordingly, each period corresponds to one year. The household has an uncertain lifetime, such that the probability to survive from until the next year + 1 is denoted by . Survival rates entering into the utility function are taken from the US Population Life Table (Arias 2010) is the coefficient of relative risk aversion; and is the time preference factor. The recursive definition of the value function is given by:
with terminal utility = � � 1− 1− and = 1 after retirement. We calibrate the preference parameters so our results match empirical claiming rates reported by the US Social Security Administration and average assets in tax-qualified retirement plans. This matching procedure produces preference parameters of = 1.2, = 5 and = 0.96 (for details, see below).
Time budget, labor income, and Social Security retirement benefits. As in Horneff et al.
(2019), our model allows for flexible work effort and retirement ages. The worker has the opportunity to allocate up to (1 − ) = 0.6 of his available time budget to paid work (assuming 100 waking hours per week and 52 weeks per year). Depending on his work effort, the uncertain yearly before-tax labor income is given by:
Here is a deterministic wage rate component which depends on age, education, sex, and an indicator for whether the individual works full time, part time, or overtime. The variable +1 = · +1 is the permanent component of wage rates with independent lognormal distributed shocks ~(−0.5σ P 2 , σ 2 ), having a mean of one and volatility of σ 2 . In addition,
is a transitory shock with volatility σ 2 and assumed uncorrelated with .
The calibration of the deterministic component of the wage rate process and the variances of the permanent and transitory wage shocks and is based on 1975-2015 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). We estimate these separately by sex and educational level, where the latter groupings are less than High School, High School graduate, and at least some college (<HS, HS, Coll+); see Appendix A, Table A1 .
Between ages 62 and 70, a worker may retire from work and claim Social Security benefits. The benefit formula is an overall concave piece-wise linear function of the worker's average indexed lifetime earnings. Accordingly, this provides an annual unreduced Social Security benefit -also named Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) -equal (in 2015) to 90 percent of (12 times) the first $826 of average indexed monthly earnings, plus 32 percent of average indexed monthly earnings over $826 and through $4,980, plus 15 percent of average indexed monthly earnings over $4,980 and through the cap $9,875. 7 Should an individual claim benefits before (after) his system-defined Normal Retirement Age of 66, his lifelong Social Security benefits will be permanently reduced (increased) according to pre-specified factors. If the individual were to work beyond age 62, the model stipulates that he devote at least one hour per week; also, our model rules out overtime work in retirement (i.e. 0.01 ≤ (1 − ) ≤ 0.4).
Wealth dynamics during the work life. During the work life, an individual has the opportunity to use current cash on hand for consumption and investments. Some portion of the worker's pre-tax salary (up to a limit of $18,000 per year) can be invested into a tax-qualified 401(k)-retirement plan of the EET or TEE type. Also, from age 50 onwards, he is permitted an additional $6,000 of 'catch-up' contributions. In addition, a worker can invest outside his retirement plan in risky stocks and riskless bonds . Hence, cash on hand in each year can is given by:
In addition to the usual constraints, , , , ≥ 0, the worker may not contribute more than ≤ $18,000 in the 401(k) plan (as per US law). One year later, his cash on hand is given by the value of stocks (bonds) having earned an uncertain (riskless) gross return of +1 ( ), plus income from work (after housing costs ℎ ), plus withdrawals ( ) from the 401(k) plan, minus any federal/state/city taxes and Social Security contributions, +1 , and health insurance costs:
We model housing costs ℎ as in Love (2010) . Our "baseline" financial market parameterizations assume a risk-free interest rate of 1%, and an equity risk premium of 4% with a return volatility of 18%. In subsequent simulations, we work with a higher interest rate of 3%, reflective of the more historically normal capital market returns. The annual cost of health insurance is set at $1200. As in Lusardi, Michaud and Mitchell (2017) , if a worker's cash on hand were to fall below +1 ≤ $5,879 p.a., the model posits that he receives a minimum welfare benefit of $5,879 the next year.
Taxation and evolution of retirement plans: During the work life and retirement, households must pay various taxes ( +1 ) which reduce cash on hand available for consumption and investment. The amount and timing of these tax payments over the life cycle differ significantly in the case of an EET versus TEE system.
First, workers must pay payroll taxes +1 amounting to 11.65%, which is the sum of 
To be considered as a safe harbor 401(k) plan and therefore avoid complex nondiscrimination testing, we assume that the employers match 100% of employee contributions up to 5% of yearly labor income. 9 Due to regulation, the matching rate can only applied to a maximum compensation of $265,000, so the maximum employer contribution is $13,250. The matching contribution is then given by:
= min( , 0.05 , $13,250).
Wealth dynamics during retirement. The worker can retire and claim Social Security benefits between age 62 and 70. After selecting his endogenous retirement age, , the individual may still elect to save outside the tax-qualified retirement plan in stocks and bonds, as follows:
His cash on hand for the next period evolves as follows:
Old age retirement benefits provided by Social Security are determined by the worker's Primary Insurance Amount (PIA), which in turn depend on his average lifetime earnings as described above. Social Security payments ( +1 ) in retirement ( ≥ ) are given by:
Here, is the mandated adjustment factor for claiming before or after the system-defined Full Retirement Age, which in our model is assumed to be age 66. 10 The variable is a transitory shock ~LN(−0.5 ℇ 2 , ℇ 2 ), which reflects out-of-pocket medical and other expenditure shocks in retirement (as in Love 2010). During retirement, benefits payments from Social Security are partially taxed by the individual federal income tax rate as well as the 4% city and state and 1.45% Medicare taxes. 11 We model the 401(k) plan payouts as follows: Under US law, plan participants must take retirement account payouts from age 70 onwards, according to the Required Minimum Distribution rules (m) specified by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS 2015b). Accordingly, withdrawals from the retirement account must take into account the following constraints:
Calibration of preference parameters and model solution. We posit that households maximize the value function (1) subject to the constraints and calibrations set out above, by optimally selecting their consumption, work effort, claiming age for Social Security benefits, investments and withdrawals from tax-qualified 401(k)-plans, and investments in as well as redemptions of stocks and bonds. As this optimization problem cannot be solved analytically, it requires a numerical procedure using dynamic stochastic programming. Accordingly, to generate optimal policy functions, in each period we discretize the space in four dimensions 30(X)×20( 401( ) )×8(P)×9(K), with being cash on hand, 401( ) assets held in the 401(k) retirement plan, P permanent income, and K the claiming age. Next, we simulate 100,000 independent life cycles based on optimal feedback controls for each of the six population subgroups of interest (male/female with <HS, HS, and Coll+). We then aggregate the subgroups to obtain national mean values using weights from the National Center on Education Statistics (20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60-69) in 2015.
To generate 401(k) simulated balances and claiming rates, we first solve the life cycle model where the individual has access to traditional EET 401(k) plans under the tax-regime in 2015 (i.e. before the reform in 2018); we then generate 100,000 lifecycles using optimal feedback controls for each of the six subgroups (male/female with <HS, HS, and Coll+). These six subgroups are aggregated to obtain national median values, using National Center on Education
Statistics (2016) (2015) for the year 2015 for nondisabled males and females. Here we see that our model closely tracks the empirically-observed early claiming age peak at age 62, as well as the second peak at the Full Retirement Age (66). The lower Panel of Figure 1 displays simulated versus empirical evidence on 401(k) assets by age groups. Again, our simulated outcomes are remarkably close to the empirically-observed 401(k) account values, implying that our model accords well with real-world data.
Figure 1 here

What Would Rothification Do?
We next illustrate how switching from traditional EET to a TEE tax regime for retirement savings would affect claiming ages, assets held inside and outside tax-qualified retirement plans, consumption, hours of work, asset and consumption inequality, and tax payments over the life cycle. In addition, we study how the results would differ, if the very low interest rate environment of the last decade ( = 1%) were to be replaced by a more historically "normal" return regime ( = 3%). This shortfall is greater in the higher return regime, such that tax qualified assets are always larger in the EET environment. By contrast, non-qualified assets are markedly lower in the EET world from age 60 onward, by about half as of the Full Retirement Age (i.e., the mid-60s). Yet in terms of consumption opportunities, the value of retirement plan assets in the EET regime is not directly comparable with that in the TEE regime. This is because withdrawals of EET assets must be taxed before they can used for consumption, while withdrawals from TEE assets are tax free. Table 1 here Impacts on consumption and work hours. 
Asset accumulation patterns.
Conclusions
This paper evaluates whether adopting a different tax treatment of retirement plan contributions would materially change Social Security benefit claiming ages and work hours, consumption, and asset allocation of workers looking ahead to retirement. We also assess whether the lower-paid would behave differently from the higher-paid, in terms of change in claiming, saving inside and outside the Roth accounts, and non-pension saving. Rothification also alters the distribution of retirement incomes relative to the current EET-system. For example, the gap between high and low-wage workers' take home pay is not diminished by income taxes under an EET system, whereas it is under a TEE program. Moreover, the Social Security replacement rate formula is progressive, as it provides relatively higher benefits for low-wage workers than for the higher paid. Given these realities, an EET scheme enhances the progressivity of overall old age income (pension account withdrawals plus Social Security benefits), whereas a TEE structure treats pension benefits more neutrally. Accordingly, it is theoretically impossible to predict how Rothification will alter household behavior without taking into account the rich institutional details confronting real-world consumers, along with the economic environment, capital and labor market risk, and uncertain lifetimes.
Our structural model is a richly specified, sophisticated formulation of lifetime behavior calibrated to US federal/state income tax and Social Security/Medicare premium structures, along with realistic Social Security benefit formulas. We account for PIA and AIME formulas, early and delayed retirement adjustments under Social Security, and real-world rules characterizing tax-qualified DC accounts including the current caps on pre-tax contributions, employer matches, penalties and taxes on early withdrawals, and Required Minimum Distribution withdrawals. This lifecycle model of work, saving, consumption, and retirement behavior provides several lessons for those interested in an alternative tax regime for pension plans. Overall, we show that that taxing pension contributions instead of withdrawals leads to later retirement ages, especially for the better-educated. It also reduces lifetime work hours, and increases consumption inequality. While there is some sensitivity to market returns, our overall conclusions remain robust to the alternative assumptions explored here. Finally, lifetime tax payments are lower by 6-10% under the Rothification tax regime. Notes: The top two panels compare claiming rates generated by our life cycle models and empirical claiming rates reported by the US Social Security Administration (see US SSA 2015) for the year 2015 (without disability). Expected values are calculated from 100,000 simulated lifecycles based on optimal feedback controls. Results for the entire female (male) population are computed using income profile for three education levels: 61% +Coll; 28% HS; 11% <HS (57% +Coll; 30% HS; 13%<HS). Parameters used for the baseline calibration are as follows: risk aversion = 5; time preference = 0.96; leisure preference = 1.2; endogenous retirement age 62-70. Social Security benefits are based on average permanent income and the bend points in place in 2015; minimum required withdrawals from 401(k) plans are based on life expectancy using the IRS-Uniform Lifetime Table in 2015; tax rules for 401(k) plans are as of 2015 and described in Appendix B. The risk premium for stocks returns is 5% and return volatility 18%; the risk free rate in the baseline case is 1%. The lower panel compares empirical 401(k) account balances across the US population. Empirical account balance data are taken from the Employee Benefit Research Institute (2017); age groups referred to as 20s, 30s, 40s, 50s, and 60s denote average values for persons age 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60-69 Values are based on 100,000 simulated lifecycles for each of the six subgroups (male / female and three education groups) using optimal feedback controls from the life cycle model. Results for the entire population are computed using the following weights for the three education levels: females (61% +Coll; 28% HS; 11% <HS) and males (57% +Coll; 30% HS; 13%<HS); the weights for females is 51% and for males 49%. Further notes on parameters see Figure 2 . Notes: The two panels show expected assets by age in tax-qualified 401(k) plans and non-qualified assets for low and high interest rate (1% and 3%), and different tax regimes. Expected values are based on 100,000 simulated lifecycles using optimal feedback controls from the life cycle model. The assumed risk premium for stock returns is 5% and return volatility 18%. For other parameters, see Figure 1 . Source: Authors' calculations. Notes: The two panels report average consumption and weekly work hours for low and high r (1% and 3%), and different tax regimes. Expected values are based on 100,000 simulated lifecycles using optimal feedback controls from the life cycle model. The assumed risk premium for stock returns is 5% and return volatility 18%. For other parameters, see Figure 1 . Source: Authors' calculations. 
Online Appendix A: Wage rate estimation
We calibrated the wage rate process using the and overtime worker (< 40 hours). OLS regression results for the wage rate process equations are provided in Table A1 .
To estimate the variances of the permanent and transitory components, we follow Carroll and Samwick (1997) and Hubener at al. (2016) . We calculate the difference of the observed log wage and the regression result, and we take the difference of these differences across different lengths of time d. For individual i, the residual is:
We then regress the = , 2 ����� on the lengths of time d between waves and a constant:
where the variance of the permanent factor 2 = 1 and the 2 = 2 represents the variance of the transitory shocks. Part-time work -0.109*** -0.153*** -0.0826*** -0.0858*** -0.129*** -0.0847*** (0.020) (0.009) (0.011) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) Over-time work 0.00412 0.0506*** 0.0949*** 0.0158*** 0.0748*** 0.106*** (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0. 
where, for ⊆ , the indicator function 1 → {0, 1} is defined as: 
